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                Dr. Xiaoli Hu is an Assistant Professor of Accountancy at City University of Hong Kong. Dr. Hu’s primary research interest includes disclosure and tax. Her research has been published in journals includingJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,China Journal of Accounting ResearchandEconomic Research Journal (in Chinese). Dr.Hu earned a Bachelor degree and a Master degree from Nanjing University and Ph.D in Business Administration from National University of Singapore in 2018.


                Under the real-option theory, managers have the incentive to wait until the announcements of scheduled macro news to make disclosure decisions. Once macro news is announced, managers disclose private information when disclosure is beneficial, leading to a clustering of corporate disclosures. Employing the setting of Federal Open Market Committee pre-scheduled meetings, we document that management guidance clusters right after FOMC meetings. The effect is more pronounced when the cost of waiting is low and when the potential benefit of waiting is high. We conclude that the option value of waiting causes corporate disclosures to cluster after scheduled macro news announcements.